Spider diagrams are a visual language for expressing logical statements. In this paper we identify a well known fragment of first order predicate logic, that we call MFOL=, equivalent in expressive power to the spider diagram language. The language MFOL= is monadic and includes equality but has no constants or function symbols. To show this equivalence, in one direction, for each diagram we construct a sentence in MFOL = that expresses the same information. For the more challenging converse we prove that there exists a finite set of models for a sentence S that can be used to classify all the models for S. Using these classifying models we show that there is a diagram expressing the same information as S.
Introduction
Euler diagrams [6] exploit topological properties of enclosure, exclusion and intersection to represent subset, disjoint sets and set intersection respectively. The diagram d 1 in figure 1 is an Euler diagram and asserts that nothing is both a car and a van. Venn diagrams [18] are similar to Euler diagrams. In Venn diagrams, all possible intersections between contours must occur and shading is used to represent the empty set. The diagram d 2 in figure 1 is a Venn diagram and also expresses that no element is both a car and a van.
Various visual languages have emerged that extend Euler and Venn diagrams. Peirce [15] increased the expressiveness of Venn diagrams by adding ⊗-sequences. The presence of an ⊗-sequence indicates the existence of an element. The Venn-II system, introduced by Shin [16] , consists of Venn diagrams together with ⊗-sequences. The diagram d 3 in figure 1 is a Venn-II diagram. In addition to the information which is expressed by the underlying Venn diagram, it also asserts that the set Cars ∪ V ans is not empty. In Venn-II, diagrams are joined by straight line segments to represent disjunction between diagrams. Venn-II diagrams can express whether a set is empty or not empty. Shin shows that Venn-II is equivalent in expressive power to a first order language that she calls L 0 . The language L 0 is a pure monadic language (i.e. all the predicate symbols are 'one place') that does not include constants or function symbols. Another visual language, called Euler/Venn, based on Euler diagrams is discussed by Swoboda and Allwein in [17] . These diagrams are similar to Venn-II diagrams but, instead of ⊗-sequences, constant sequences are used. The diagram d 4 in figure 2 is an Euler/Venn diagram and asserts that no element is both a car and a van and that there is something called 'ford' that is either a car or a van. Swoboda and Allwein give an algorithm that determines whether a given monadic first order formula is "observable" from a given diagram. If the formula is observable from the diagram then it is a consequence of the information contained in the diagram, but need not express all the information in the diagram.
Like Euler/Venn diagrams, spider diagrams are based on Euler diagrams. Rather than allowing the use of constant sequences 1 as in Euler/Venn diagrams, spiders denote the existence of elements. Unlike the ⊗-sequences, distinct spiders denote distinct elements. The spider diagram d 5 in figure 2 asserts that no element is both a car and a van and there are at least two elements, one is a car and the other is a car or a van. The spider diagram d 6 asserts that there are exactly three vans that are not cars. Spiders (by their existential import) allow a lower bound to be placed on the cardinality of sets. Shading allows upper bounds to be placed on the cardinality of sets.
Several sound and complete spider diagram systems have been developed [11, 12, 14] . A tool to support reasoning with spider diagrams has been developed, available from [1] . In [8] an algorithm is presented that, given any spider diagrams D 1 and D 2 , either constructs a proof from D 1 to D 2 , or provides a model for D 1 that is not a model for D 2 . The proofs constructed by this algorithm tend to be long and unwieldy. In [7] a heuristic approach to proof writing in the spider diagram system is developed, but is restricted to the case of unitary spider diagrams. The authors invoke the A * algorithm [3] to find a shortest proof, provided such a proof exists.
In this paper we prove that the spider diagram language is equivalent in expressive power to a fragment of first order logic that we call MFOL = . The language MFOL = extends L 0 by adding equality, so MFOL = is monadic predicate logic with equality. Within L 0 it is not possible to express that a particular property, P , holds for a unique element: ∃ x (P (x) ∧ ∀ y (P (y) ⇒ x = y)).
Thus spider diagrams increase expressiveness over Venn-II. Although we do not include constants in MFOL = or given spiders (to represent constants) in our spider diagram language, this is not a significant restriction. It is relatively straightforward to show that adding constants to either of these languages does not lead to an increase in expressiveness. However, the omission of function symbols is more significant: the standard elimination of function symbols in terms of relation symbols relies upon binary predicate symbols which we do not have.
In section 2 we give the syntax and semantics of spider diagrams. We define MFOL = in section 3. In section 4 we identify when a diagram and a sentence express the same information. We address the task of mapping each diagram to a sentence expressing the same information in section 5, showing that the spider diagram language is at most as expressive as MFOL = . In section 6 we show that MFOL = is at most as expressive as spider diagrams. We will outline Shin's algorithmic approach to show L 0 (in which there is no equality) is not more expressive than Venn-II. It is simple to adapt this algorithm to find a spider diagram that expresses the same information as a sentence in MFOL = that does not involve equality. However, for sentences in MFOL = that do involve equality, the algorithm does not readily generalize. Thus we take a different approach. To motivate our approach we consider relationships between models for diagrams. We consider the models for a sentence and show that there is a finite set of models that can be used to classify all the models for the sentence. These classifying models can then be used to construct a diagram that expresses the same information as the sentence.
Spider Diagrams
In diagrammatic systems, it is helpful to distinguish two levels of syntax: concrete (or token) syntax and abstract (or type) syntax [10] . Concrete syntax captures the physical representation of a diagram. Abstract syntax 'forgets' semantically irrelevant spatial relations between syntactic elements in a concrete diagram. We include the concrete syntax to aid intuition but we work at the abstract level.
Informal concrete syntax
A contour is a simple closed plane curve. Each contour is labelled. Within a unitary diagram, the same label cannot be used twice. A boundary rectangle properly contains all contours. The boundary rectangle is not a contour and is not labelled. A basic region is the bounded area of the plane enclosed by a contour or a boundary rectangle. A region is defined recursively as follows: any basic region is a region; if r 1 and r 2 are regions then the union, intersection and difference of r 1 and r 2 are regions provided these are non-empty. A zone is a region having no other region contained within it. A region is shaded if each of its component zones is shaded. A spider is a tree with nodes (called feet) placed in different zones. The connecting edges (called legs) are straight line segments. A spider touches a zone if one of its feet is placed in that zone. A spider is said to inhabit the region which is the union of the zones it touches. This union of zones is called the habitat of the spider.
A concrete unitary spider diagram is a single boundary rectangle together with a finite collection of contours, shading and spiders. No two contours in the same unitary diagram can have the same label. We place certain well-formedness conditions on unitary diagrams. We stipulate that each zone is connected. There must be at least one zone inside each contour (this follows from the fact that contours are simple closed plane curves). The boundary rectangle properly contains all contours, so there is a zone inside the boundary rectangle but outside all the contours.
Example 1 Spider diagram d 6 in figure 2 (section 1) has two contours and four zones. The shaded zone is inhabited by three spiders, each with one foot.
Formal Abstract Syntax
We can think of the contour labels used in our diagrams as being chosen from a countably infinite set, L. A zone, at the concrete level, can be described by the set of labels of the contours that include it. When we reason with a spider diagram, its contour label set may change, so we will define an abstract zone to be a pair of sets, (a, b). The set a contains the labels of the contours that include (a, b) whereas b is the set of labels of the contours that do not include (a, b). So, a and b form a partition of the contour label set. Now we consider how we represent spiders at the abstract level. In order to describe the spiders in a concrete diagram, it is sufficient to say how many spiders there are in each region. We could specify any finite set to be a collection of spiders, and map each of these spiders to a region in the diagram, giving its habitat. For any given concrete diagram, then, there would potentially be many choices for an abstract set of spiders. In order to give a unique abstraction from a concrete diagram we will use a bag of regions, called spider identifiers, rather than an arbitrary set of spiders.
Definition 2 An abstract unitary spider diagram, d, (with labels in L) is a tuple L, Z, Z * , SI whose components are defined as follows. represented in each region. The number of spiders contained by region r 1 in d is denoted by S(r 1 , d). More formally,
So, any spider in d whose habitat is a subset of r 1 contributes to the sum S(r 1 , d).
The number of spiders touching r 1 in d is denoted by T (r 1 , d). More formally,
So, any spider in d that has a foot in r 1 contributes to the sum T (r 1 , d).
Unitary diagrams form the building blocks of compound diagrams. If D 1 and D 2 are spider diagrams then so are D 1 ("not D 1 "), (D 1 D 2 ) ("D 1 or D 2 ") and (D 1 D 2 ) ("D 1 and D 2 "). Some diagrams are not satisfiable and we introduce the symbol ⊥, defined to be a unitary diagram interpreted as false. Our convention will be to denote unitary diagrams by d and arbitrary diagrams by D.
Semantics
Regions in spider diagrams represent sets. We can express lower bounds and, in the case of shaded regions, upper bounds on the cardinalities of the sets that we are representing as follows. If region r contains n spiders in diagram d then d expresses that the set represented by r contains at least n elements. If r is shaded and touched by m spiders in d then d expresses that the set represented by r contains at most m elements. Thus, if d has a shaded, untouched region, r, then d expresses that r represents the empty set. Missing zones also represent the empty set. To formalize the semantics we shall map contour labels, zones and regions to subsets of some universal set. We define Z and R to be the sets of all abstract zones and abstract regions respectively. So,
where PF(L) denotes the set of all finite subsets of L, and R = PF(Z).
Definition 4 An interpretation of contour labels, zones and regions, or simply an interpretation, is a pair (U, Ψ) where U is a set and Ψ: L ∪ Z ∪ R → PU is a function mapping contour labels, zones and regions to subsets of U such that the images of the zones and regions are completely determined by the images of the contour labels as follows.
where Ψ(l) = U − Ψ(l) and we define l∈∅ Ψ(l) = U = l∈∅ Ψ(l).
For each region r,
We introduce a semantics predicate which identifies whether a diagram expresses a true statement, with respect to an interpretation. 3 The language MFOL = Spider diagrams do not have syntactic elements to represent constants or functions. We can express statements of the form 'there are at least n elements in A' and 'there are at most m elements in A'. A first order language equivalent in expressive power to the spider diagram language will involve equality, to allow us to express distinctness of elements, and monadic predicates, to allow us to express x ∈ A. In order to define such a language we require a countably infinite set of monadic predicate symbols, P, from which all monadic predicate symbols will be drawn. Moreover, we also require a countably infinite set of variables, V, from which all variables will be drawn.
Definition 7
The first order language MFOL = consists of the following.
1.
Atomic formulae which are defined as follows, (a) if x i and x j are variables then (x i = x j ) is an atomic formula, (b) if P i ∈ P and x j is a variable then P i (x j ) is an atomic formula.
2.
Formulae, which are defined inductively.
(a) Atomic formulae are formulae.
(b) ⊥ and are formulae.
(c) If p and q are formulae so are (p ∧ q), (p ∨ q) and ¬p.
(d) If p is a formula and x j is a variable then (∀x j p) and (∃x j p) are formulae.
We define F and S to be the sets of formulae and sentences (formulae with no free variables) of the language MFOL = respectively.
We shall assume the standard first order predicate logic semantic interpretation of formulae in this language (see, for example, [2] ) with one exception: we allow a structure to have an empty domain. Logic with potentially empty structures is explored in [9, 13] . The motivation for this non-standard choice comes from the intended application domain for spider diagrams: modelling object oriented software systems. The domain will consist of the objects in the system and in some instances there will be no objects (for example, in an initial state before any objects have been created).
Structures and Interpretations
We wish to identify when a diagram and a sentence express the same information. To aid us formalize this notion, we map interpretations to structures in such a way that information is preserved. For this discussion we fix the set of labels L = {L 1 , L 2 , ...} and the set of monadic predicate symbols P = {P 1 , P 2 , ...}. We identify corresponding labels and predicates L i and P i . We also fix V = {x 1 , x 2 , ...}. Define U to be the class of all sets. The sets in U form the domains of structures in the language MFOL = .
Definition 8 Define IN T to be the class of all interpretations for spider diagrams over L, that is
where (U, Ψ) is an interpretation. Define also ST R to be the class of structures for the language MFOL = over P, that is
where P m i is the interpretation of P i in the structure m (that is, P m i ⊆ U ) and we always interpret = as the diagonal subset of U × U , denoted diag(U × U ).
Lemma 9 The function, h: IN T → ST R defined by
h(U, Ψ) = U, diag(U × U ), Ψ(L 1 ), Ψ(L 2 ), ...
is a bijection.
Essentially, h(U, Ψ) is just a different way of writing (U, Ψ). Our aim is to identify, for each diagram, a sentence that expresses the same information. We also aim, for each sentence, to identify a diagram that expresses the same information and we now formalize this notion. A diagram and a sentence express the same information when h provides a bijective correspondence between their models, illustrated in figure 4. Definition 10 Let D be a diagram and S be a sentence. We say D and S are expressively equivalent if and only if
So, a diagram and a sentence are expressively equivalent if they have essentially the same models.
Mapping from Diagrams to Sentences
To show that the spider diagram language is not more expressive than MFOL = we will map diagrams to expressively equivalent sentences. An α-diagram is a spider diagram in which all spiders inhabit exactly one zone [14] .
Theorem 11 Every spider diagram is semantically equivalent to an α-diagram [12] .
Proof (Sketch) Spider legs represent disjunction within a unitary diagram, d. Therefore, if there is a spider, s, in d that inhabits region r 1 ∪ r 2 where r 1 ∩ r 2 = ∅ then d is semantically equivalent to d 1 d 2 where each of d 1 and d 2 are copies of d except that s inhabits r 1 in d 1 and r 2 in d 2 , thus removing a spider's leg. This process of splitting spiders can be repeated until all spiders inhabit exactly one zone.
It follows that to show that the spider diagram language is at most as expressive as MFOL = it is sufficient to identify an expressively equivalent sentence for each α-diagram. figure 5 contains three spiders, one outside both L 1 and L 2 , the other two inside L 2 and outside L 1 and is expressively equivalent to the sentence
The diagram d 2 asserts that no elements can be in L 3 and not in L 1 (due to the missing zone) and no element can be in both L 1 and L 3 (due to the shading) and is expressively equivalent to the sentence
To construct sentences for diagrams, it is useful to map zones to formulae as follows.
Definition 13 Define a function to map zones to formulae, ZF:
We use the function ZF to construct a sentence of MFOL = for each zone in a unitary α-diagram. We shall take these zone sentences in conjunction to identify a sentence expressively equivalent to the diagram. We define D α 0 to be the class of all unitary α-diagrams and D α to be the class of all α-diagrams. 2. If z is not shaded in d and S({z}, d) = n > 0 then
3. If z is either missing from d or is shaded in d and S({z}, d) = 0 then
.
We wish to show, for unitary α-diagram d, that DS(d) is expressively equivalent to d. To do this, we shall consider each zone of d in turn. Thus it is useful to consider when an interpretation satisfies a zone, which we now define.
Definition 16
Let p = (U, Ψ) be an interpretation and let d be a unitary α-diagram. Let z ∈ V Z(d). Given d, we say p satisfies z, denoted p |= d z, if and only if the following hold.
1. The number of elements in the set represented by z is at least the number of spiders in z:
2. If z is shaded or missing then the number of elements in the set represented by z equals the number of spiders in z:
Lemma 17 Let p = (U, Ψ) be an interpretation and let d ( = ⊥) be a unitary αdiagram. The interpretation p satisfies d if and only if p satisfies all the Venn zones of d:
Proof (Sketch) Noting that when d is an α-diagram, S(r, d) = T (r, d) for each region r in d the result follows from a straightforward restatement of the semantics predicate.
The result then follows by lemma 17.
Corollary 19 Let D be an α-diagram. Then D is expressively equivalent to DS(D).
Theorem 20 The language of spider diagrams is at most as expressive as the language MFOL = .
Mapping from Sentences to Diagrams
We now consider the more challenging task of constructing a diagram for a sentence.
Since every formula is semantically equivalent to a sentence obtained by prefixing the formula with ∀x i for each free variable x i (i.e. constructing its universal closure), we only need to identify a diagram expressively equivalent to each sentence.
In [17] Swoboda and Allwein give an algorithm that determines whether a given first order logic sentence containing only monadic predicates can be observed from a given Euler/Venn diagram. Sentences observable from a diagram are logical consequences of the diagram (but the diagram and the sentence are not necessarily expressing the same information). They also give an algorithm to determine if a diagram is observable from a sentence. Firstly they manipulate the sentence into a special normal form that they call Euler/Venn conjunctive normal form (EVCNF). Using this normal form it is then possible to construct a directed acyclic graph (DAG) for the sentence. A DAG is also constructed for the given diagram. Transformation rules are then applied to the DAG for the sentence (analogous to reasoning rules for their Euler/Venn system) to determine whether it can be changed into the DAG arising from the diagram. If it can then the diagram is observable from the sentence. The approach to determine if a sentence is observable from a diagram is similar.
Shin's approach to show Venn-II is equally as expressive as language L 0 (MFOL = without equality) is algorithmic [16] . To find a diagram expressively equivalent to a sentence, she first converts the sentence into prenex normal form, say Q 1 x 1 ...Q n x n G where each Q i is a quantifier and G is quantifier free. If Q n is universal then G is transformed into conjunctive normal form. If Q n is existential then G is transformed into disjunctive normal form. The quantifier Q n is then distributed through G and as many formulae are removed from its scope as possible. All n quantifiers are distributed through the sentence in this way. The sentence resulting from this process has no nested quantifiers. A diagram can then be drawn for each of the simple parts of the resulting formula. To adapt this algorithm to find expressively equivalent diagrams for sentences in MFOL = that do not involve equality is straightforward. Example 21 Applying Shin's algorithm to the sentence ∃x 1 ∀x 2 (P 1 (x 1 ) ∨ P 2 (x 2 )) gives rise to the diagram shown in figure 6 (recall that in Venn-II disjunction between diagrams is denoted by connecting them with a straight line segment).
Shin's algorithm does not readily generalize to arbitrary sentences in MFOL = because = is a dyadic predicate symbol which means nesting of quantifiers cannot necessarily be removed. We take a different approach, modelled on the classic result of Dreben and Goldforb [4] , pages 209-210. To establish the existence of a diagram expressively equivalent to a sentence we consider models for that sentence. To illustrate the approach we consider relationships between models for α-diagrams.
L L d Figure 7 : Extending models for a diagram.
Example 22
The diagram in figure 7 has a minimal model (in the sense that the cardinality of the universal set is minimal)
and, for i = 1, 2, Ψ(L i ) = ∅. This model can be used to characterize all the models for the diagram, up to isomorphism. We can use this model to generate further models, by adding elements to U and we may add these elements to images of contour labels if we so choose. As an example, the element 4 can be added to U and we redefine Ψ(L 2 ) = {2, 3, 4} to give another model for d. No matter what changes we make to the model, we must ensure that the zone ({L 1 }, {L 2 }) always represents a set containing exactly one element or we will create an interpretation that does not satisfy the diagram. We can add elements to all and only the sets represented by zones which are not shaded. Adding elements in this way will generate all models for d, up to isomorphism.
In considering models for MFOL = sentences we will use the notion of a predicate intersection set. This is the interpretation of the conjunction of certain monadic predicate symbols, and thus corresponds to the interpretation of a zone in a diagram.
Suppose m is a model for sentence S. We will show that if a predicate intersection set satisfies certain cardinality conditions then we can increase the cardinality of that predicate intersection set (enlarging m) and still have a model for S. We are able to use this fact to show that there is a finite set of models for S that can be used to classify all the models for S. Moreover, we can use this classifying set to construct a diagram expressively equivalent to S.
Definition 23 Let m be a structure and let X and Y be finite subsets of P (the countably infinite set of predicate symbols). Define the predicate intersection set in m with respect to X and Y , denoted P I(m, X, Y ), to be
In the context of MFOL = , we will identify all the structures that can be generated from a given structure, m, by adding or renaming elements subject to cardinality restrictions determined by sentence S. We will call this class of structures generated by m the cone of m, given S. For each sentence, S, we will show that there is a finite set of models, the union of whose cones is precisely the collection of models for S. Formalizing and proving this insight is the kernel of the result here. Central to our approach is the notion of similar structures with respect to S. To define similar structures we use the maximum number of nested quantifiers in S 2 .
Example 24 Let S be the sentence ∀x 1 P 1 (x 1 ) ∧ ∀x 1 ∃x 2 ¬(x 1 = x 2 ). The formula ∀x 1 P 1 (x 1 ) has one nested quantifier and ∀x 1 ∃x 2 ¬(x 1 = x 2 ) has two nested quantifiers. Therefore the maximum number of nested quantifiers in S is two. Now, n nested quantifiers introduce n variable names, and so it is only possible to talk about (at most) n distinct individuals within the body of the formula. This has the effect of limiting the complexity of what can be said by such a formula. In the particular case here, this observation has the effect that if a model for S has at least two elements in certain predicate intersection sets then S does not place an upper bound on the cardinalities of those predicate intersection sets.
In a model for S, the interpretation of P 1 has to contain all the elements, of which there must be at least two. Also, S constrains the predicate intersection set P I(m, ∅, {P 1 }) to have cardinality zero. As an example, we consider two models, m 1 and m 2 with domains U 1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and U 2 = {1, 2, 5, 6, 7}, respectively, that are characterized by P The following definition, lemmas 26, 28 and corollary 27 are adapted (by changing the notation and adding details to the proofs) from [4] , pages 209-210.
Definition 25 Let S be a sentence and define q(S) to be the maximum number of nested quantifiers in S and P (S) to be the set of monadic predicate symbols in S. Two structures m 1 and m 2 are called similar with respect to S if and only if for each subset X of P (S), either These structures are homomorphic (indeed, they are isomorphic) but they are not similar with respect to the sentence ∀x 1 (P 1 (x 1 ) ∨ P 2 (x 1 )). For example,
Therefore, when X = {P 1 }, neither condition (1) nor condition (2) in the definition of similar structures hold for m 4 and m 5 . We also observe that, given a sentence S, if we restrict the set of predicate symbols in our language MFOL = to include only those in S (i.e P (S)), along with equality, then similar structures are also homomorphic. 
is true in m 1 under this assignment. We will show that P k (v) is true in m 2 under this assignment. Now, there exist X and Y , both subsets of P (S), such that
Moreover, since P k (v) is true in m 1 under this assignment, P k ∈ X. Since m 1 and m 2 are similar with respect to S it follows that X = Y . Thus P k (v) is true in m 2 under this assignment. The converse is similar. Let G be ∃vH, and suppose an assignment of values in U 1 ∩U 2 to the free variables of G is fixed. Let Y be the set of values so assigned. Since G is a subformula of S, it contains at most q(S) − 1 free variables. Hence |Y | < q(S). Suppose G is true in m 1 under the assignment. Hence there is an a in U 1 such that H is true in m 1 when, additionally, the variable v is assigned the value a. If a ∈ U 2 , then by the inductive hypothesis, H is true in m 2 under the augmented assignment.
Suppose therefore that a is not in U 2 , and let a be in P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X), where X ⊆ P (S). Thus so P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) ∩ P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X) has cardinality at least q(S). But then there is an element b of (P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) ∩ P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X)) − Y . Let γ: U 1 → U 1 carry a to b, b to a and every other member of U 1 to itself. Then γ is an automorphism of the structure m 1 , because the sets P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) completely characterize the model m 1 by partitioning the elements according to which of the monadic predicates that they satisfy and interchanging two elements within the same partition therefore changes none of the logical properties of the structure, and γ is the identity on Y . Hence H is true in m 1 under the original assignment augmented by assigning b to v. Then, by the inductive hypothesis, H is true in m 2 under this augmented assignment, so ∃vH is true in m 2 under the original assignment. We have shown that if G is true in m 1 then G is true in m 2 . The converse is similar.
The case G = ∀vH remains. Since G is logically equivalent to ¬∃v¬H the preceding arguments suffice.
Corollary 27
If m 1 and m 2 are similar structures with respect to S, then m 1 is a model for S if and only if m 2 is a model for S.
Lemma 28 Let S be a sentence. If S has a model of any cardinality at least 2 |P (S)| q(S) then S has models of every cardinality at least 2 |P (S)| q(S).
Proof Suppose S has a model m 1 with universe U 1 of cardinality at least 2 |P (S)| q(S). Then |P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X)| ≥ q(S) for at least one X ⊆ P (S). So, for each j ≥ 2 |P (S)| q(S) there is a structure m 2 similar to m 1 whose universe has cardinality j. Hence there are models for S with every cardinality at least 2 |P (S)| q(S).
The (upward) Löwenheim-Skolem theorem tells us that if a sentence of first order logic has a model of a particular infinite cardinality, then it has models of all larger cardinalities; it is not the case that this holds for finite models. A simple counterexample is the sentence which states that P is an equivalence relation all of whose equivalence classes are of size two; the finite models of this will necessarily have even cardinality.
Definition 29 Let S be a sentence and suppose m is a model for S. If the cardinality of m is at most 2 |P (S)| q(s) then we say m is a small model for S. Otherwise we say m is a large model for S.
Definition 30 Let S be a sentence and suppose m 1 is a small model for S. An S-extension of m 1 is a structure, m 2 , for MFOL = such that for each subset, X, of The cone of m 1 given S, denoted cone(m 1 , S) , is a class of structures such that m 2 ∈ cone(m 1 , S) if and only if m 2 is isomorphic to some S-extension of m 1 .
The cone of m given S contains models for S that can be restricted to (models isomorphic to) m. We can think of elements of cone(m, S) as extending m in certain 'directions' and fixing m in others.
Example 31 Let S be the sentence ∃x 1 ∃x 2 P 1 (x 1 ) ∨ P 2 (x 2 ) which has q(S) = 2. So, if we have predicate intersection sets containing two or more elements we can add arbitrarily many elements to them and preserve the fact that S holds. Consider Example 32 Let S be the sentence ∀x 1 ∀x 2 x 1 = x 2 and consider the structure m 1 = {1}, = m 1 , ∅, ∅, ∅, ... which satisfies S. We have the following cone for m 1 :
The class cone(m 1 , S) contains only structures that are models for S but does not contain them all, for example m 3 = ∅, ∅, ... satisfies S but m 3 is not in cone(m 1 , S).
All models for S are in the class cone(m 1 , S) ∪ cone(m 3 , S). In this sense, m 1 and m 3 classify all the models for S. We can draw a diagram expressively equivalent to S using information given by m 1 and m 3 . This diagram is a disjunction of two unitary diagrams, shown in figure 9 .
Lemma 33 Let S be a sentence and suppose m 1 is a large model for S. Then there exists a small model, m 2 , for S such that m 1 ∈ cone(m 2 , S). @ @ Figure 9 : A diagram expressively equivalent to ∀x 1 ∀x 2 x 1 = x 2 .
Proof Define m 2 as follows. Let X be a subset of P (S). If |P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X)| < q(S) define M X = P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X). Otherwise define M X to be some chosen subset of P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) with cardinality q(S). The domain of m 2 is
The set U 2 has cardinality at most 2 |P (S)| q(S). Define, for each P i ∈ P, P m 2 i = P m 1 i ∩ U 2 . We will show that structure m 2 is similar to m 1 and we will refer to the domain of m 1 by U 1 . Let X be a subset of P (S). Now
It follows that P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X) ⊆ P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X). Suppose that |P I(m 1 , X, P (S))| ≥ q(S). Then there is a subset of P I(m 1 , X, P (S)− X) with cardinality q(S) that is also a subset of U 2 , namely M X . In which case |P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X)| = q(s) and |P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) ∩ P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X)| ≥ q(S).
Alternatively, |P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X)| < q(S). In which case P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) ⊆ U 2 . Hence P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) = P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X).
Let Y be a subset of P (S) that is distinct from X. Now Hence m 1 and m 2 are similar with respect to S. By corollary 27, m 2 is a model for S, so m 2 is a small model for S. We now show that m 1 is in the class cone(m 2 , S). For each subset X of P (S), we have P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X) ⊆ P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X).
then P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X) = P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X)
and it follows that m 1 is an S-extension of m 2 . Hence m 1 is in the class cone(m 2 , S).
Thus for each large model, m 1 , for S there exists a small model, m 2 , for S such that m 1 ∈ cone(m 2 , S).
Lemma 34 Let m 1 be a small model for sentence S. Then cone(m 1 , S) only contains models for S.
Proof It is sufficient to prove that any S-extension of m 1 is a model for S, since it is clear that isomorphism preserves the sentences modelled by structures. Let m 2 be an S-extension of m 1 . We will show that m 2 is similar to m 1 , with respect to S. Since m 2 is an S-extension of m 1 , it is the case that, for each subset X of P (S), Furthermore P I(m 1 , X, P (S) − X) ⊆ P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X),
Therefore m 2 is similar to m 1 , with respect to S. By corollary 27, m 2 is a model for S.
We will show that, given a sentence, S, there is a finite set of small models, the union of whose cones gives rise to only and all the models for S. We are able to use these models to identify a diagram expressively equivalent to S. In order to identify such a finite set we require the notion of partial isomorphism between structures.
Definition 35
Let m 1 and m 2 be structures for MFOL = with domains U 1 and U 2 respectively. Let Q be a set of monadic predicate symbols. If there exists a bijection γ:
then m 1 and m 2 are isomorphic restricted to Q and γ is a partial isomorphism.
Lemma 36 Let S be a sentence and let m 1 and m 2 be structures. If m 1 and m 2 are isomorphic restricted to P (S) then m 1 is a model for S if and only if m 2 is a model for S.
Lemma 37 There are finitely many small models for sentence S, up to isomorphism restricted to P (S).
Proof (Sketch)
There is a finite choice for the size of each of the predicate intersection sets (because they are small) and a finite number of these, given P (S).
Lemma 38 Let S be a sentence and let m 1 and m 2 be structures isomorphic restricted to P (S). If m 1 and m 2 are small models for S then cone(m 1 , S) = cone(m 2 , S).
Proof Since m 1 and m 2 are isomorphic restricted to P (S), for each subset X of P (S) it is the case that Definition 39 Let S be a sentence. A set of small models, c(S), for S is called a classifying set of models for S if for each small model, m 1 , for S there is a unique m 2 in c(S) such that m 1 and m 2 are isomorphic, restricted to P (S).
Lemma 40 Let S be a sentence. Then there exists a set of classifying models for S and all such sets are finite.
Proof Choose one small model from each equivalence class of small models under the relation of partial isomorphism restricted to P (S) to give c(S). Finiteness follows from lemma 37.
We will now show that the union of the cones of the models in c(S) is precisely the collection of models for S.
Theorem 41 Let S be a sentence and c(S) be a classifying set of models for S. Then We must now show that all the models for S are in Hence m∈c(S) cone(m, S) is precisely the collection of models for S.
To summarize, we have shown that every sentence, S, has a finite set of classifying models and the union of the cones of these classifying models is precisely the collection of models for S. We will now use these classifying models to construct a diagram expressively equivalent to S.
Definition 42 Let m be a small model for a sentence S. The unitary α-diagram, d, representing m given S, denoted REP(m, S) = d, is defined as follows 3 .
1. The contour labels arise from the predicate symbols in P (S):
2. The diagram is in Venn form:
That is, d contains all possible zones.
3. The shaded zones in d are given as follows. Let X be a subset of P (S) such that |P I(m, X, P (S) − X)| < q(S). The zone (a,
4. The number of spiders in each zone is the cardinality of the set |P I(m, X, P (S) − X)| where X gives rise to the containing set of contour labels for that zone. More formally, the set of spider identifiers is: Example 43 Let S be the sentence ∃x 1 P 1 (x 1 ) ∨ ∀x 1 P 1 (x 1 ). To find a classifying set of models we must consider structures of all cardinalities up to 2 |{P 1 }| × q(S) = 2 1 × 1 = 2. There are six distinct structures (up to isomorphism restricted to P (S)) with cardinality at most 2. Four of these structures are models for S and are listed below. figure 10 respectively. The diagram d 1 d 2 d 3 d 4 is expressively equivalent to S. This is not the 'natural' diagram one would associate with S. We note here that m 4 is an S-extension of m 2 , so cone(m 2 , S) ⊆ cone(m 4 , S). The sentence S is, therefore, expressively equivalent to d 1 d 2 d 3 . In general, when constructing a diagram expressively equivalent to S we only need to draw a diagram for each model in c(S) that is not (isomorphic to) an S-extension of some other model in c(S).
In fact, we can make further refinements to our approach. We note that d 2 d 3 is semantically equivalent to d 5 in figure 11 . By capturing this kind of property at the model level, which may involve defining an algebra of structures, we could further reduce the number of models required to define SD(S). We would, though, need to mark each predicate intersection set with whether it could be extended indefinitely.
Theorem 44 Let S be a sentence. Then S is expressively equivalent to SD(S). d # L Figure 11 : Refining the approach.
Proof Let c(S) be a set of classifying models for S. For each m 1 ∈ c(S), we will show that the models for the diagram REP(m 1 , S) are in bijective correspondence (under h defined in lemma 9) with the structures in cone(m 1 , S). To do so, we show firstly that any model for d = REP(m 1 , S) is in cone(m 1 , S). Secondly we will show that the inverse, under h, of any element in cone(m 1 , S) is a model for d.
Let (U, Ψ) be a model for d. We will now show h(U, Ψ) ∈ cone(m 1 , S). To do so, we will show that h(U, Ψ) is an S-extension of some small model, m 2 , for S and that m 2 is isomorphic, restricted to P (S), to m 1 .
We define m 2 as follows. Let X be a subset of P (S). Choose such an injection, f X . We define the domain of m 2 to be U 2 where
We note that U 2 ⊆ U and, since m 1 is a small model for S, |U 2 | ≤ 2 |P (S)| q(S). Moreover, |U 2 | = |U 1 | (where U 1 is the domain of m 1 ). Next we define, for each P i ∈ P,
We define a bijection, γ: U 1 → U 2 , by γ = X⊆P (S) f X . It is straightforward to verify that γ is a partial isomorphism. It follows that cone(m 2 , S) = cone(m 1 , S), by lemma 38. We now show that h(U, Ψ) is an S-extension of m 2 . Let X be a subset of P (S). Now P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X) =
It follows that P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X) ⊆ P I(h(U, Ψ), X, P (S) − X).
In order to show that h(U, Ψ) is an S-extension of m 2 , all that remains is to show that when |P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X)| < q(S) we have P I(m 2 , X, P (S) − X) = P I(h(U, Ψ), X, P (S) − X). It follows that SD(S) is expressively equivalent to S. Theorem 45 The language of spider diagrams and MFOL = are equally expressive.
Conclusion
In this paper we have identified a fragment of first order predicate logic equivalent in expressive power to the spider diagram language. To show that the spider diagram language is at most as expressive as MFOL = , we identified a sentence in MFOL = that expressed the same information as a given diagram. To show that MFOL = is at most as expressive as the language of spider diagrams we considered relationships between models for sentences. We have shown that it is possible to classify all the models for a sentence by a finite set of models. We then used these classifying models to define a spider diagram expressively equivalent to S. An interesting area, yet to be explored, is how the reasoning rules for first order logic compare with the reasoning rules for spider diagrams.
